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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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GEORGE K. KEENER 
 
v. 
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ROBERT WIENCKOSKI 
 
George K. Keener, 
       Appellant 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 96-cv-05075) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 2, 1997 
 
Before: SLOVITER, Chief Judge 
STAPLETON and COWEN Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed October 17, 1997) 
 
       George K. Keener, 
       Dallas, PA 
 
        Appellant Pro Se 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
Appellant George Keener seeks to appeal the order of the 
district court denying his motion for leave to proceed in 
that court in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1915(g). Following the filing of his notice of appeal Keener 
sought to proceed in this court in forma pauperis and 
requested appointment of counsel. We have determined 
that the issue is a straightforward one which can be 
decided without further briefing, and deny the motion for 
counsel. 
 
The Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), which was 
enacted on April 26, 1996, precludes a prisoner from 
proceeding in forma pauperis if that prisoner: 
 
       has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated 
       or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal 
       in a court of the United States that was dismissed on 
       the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to 
       state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless 
       the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious 
       physical injury. 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1915(g). 
 
The district court denied Keener's motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis because he had previously filed numerous 
civil rights actions which had been dismissed as frivolous 
by that court. The most recent three were dismissed on 
July 12, 1995, March 1, 1995, and February 4, 1994, all 
before the enactment of the PLRA. Thus this appeal 
requires us to decide whether lawsuits dismissed as 
frivolous before the enactment of the PLRA can be counted 
toward the Act's "three strikes" provisions. 1 
 
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 280 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over Keener's S 1983 
action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331. We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
(1994), the Supreme Court directed courts to determine the 
retroactive application of a new statute which does not 
expressly prescribe its reach by ascertaining whether its 
application to pending cases would "impair rights a party 
possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for 
past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed." 
 
Three courts of appeals have already applied those 
criteria to this provision of the PLRA and ruled that 
lawsuits dismissed as frivolous prior to the enactment of 
the PLRA count as "strikes" under S1915(g). See Adepegba 
v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 1996); Abdul-Wadood 
v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023 (7th Cir. 1996); Green v. 
Nottingham, 90 F.3d 415 (10th Cir. 1996). We see no basis 
to differ with that result. 
 
We thus now join those circuits in holding that 
dismissals for frivolousness prior to the passage of the 
PLRA are included among the three that establish the 
threshold for requiring a prisoner to pay the full docket fees 
unless the prisoner can show s/he is "under imminent 
danger of serious physical injury." The district court noted 
that nothing in Keener's complaint, in which he appeared 
to be alleging that he has been hindered in obtaining 
release on parole after completion of his minimum 
sentence, suggests that Keener is in any imminent danger 
of serious physical injury.2 
 
We will therefore deny Keener's motion to proceed in 
forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal without prejudice 
to Keener's right to reinstitute his action in the district 
court upon payment of full docketing fees. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We have no occasion to consider the statutory provision that counts 
among the dismissals that are disqualifying those that were dismissed 
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, as 
distinguished from frivolousness. Cf. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 
1491-92 (11th Cir. 1997)(Lay, J. concurring)(discussing constitutional 
significance of difference between dismissals for frivolousness and 
failure 
to state a claim in context of 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e)(2)(B), the PLRA 
provision mandating sua sponte dismissal of in forma pauperis actions 
that are frivolous or fail to state a claim). 
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